Bob Morris, the author of this article, raises a number of relevant issues, all of which together should really give every Californian pause to reconsider their support for this project.
Perhaps cost is the greatest reason. We went from $33 billion to the current $43 billion that the rail authority admits to. Meanwhile, the CARRD group has used the CHSRA's own documented numbers to demonstrate that costs are now $66 billion and the arithmetic is far from complete. I'd venture a price more like $100 billion. Among other items, we need to calculate who's costs they are, and what the cost of the money will be. The Boston Big Dig went from a final cost of $18 billion to $22 billion when interest payments were included. (Their original cost estimate was around $2 billion.) Much more cost information needs to come to light.
Because the California HSR project has been primarily a political boondoggle project, promoted as a concept rather than as a real transportation augmentation for the state, the plans change weekly, based on political demands, funding availability, and the constant discovery that reality is far more challenging than anticipated. Instead of experienced professionals, the impression is one of kids in a sandbox playing with choo-choo trains. And, like little kids, they are constantly making up new explanations for what they suddenly decide to do.
To persist with this image, there are endless quarrels among "stakeholders" about which routes or alignments are best. Turn here or there? Build it up here and down there? Start here or there? This suggests either a charming but pointless game, or indecisiveness based on expediency and opportunity rather than strategically developed agendas that take everyone's concerns and practicalities into account.
I can only imagine the behind-the-scenes daily scramble for new public relations word-smithing, converting engineering bad news into a new decision that is positive sounding, such as "this is what we intended right along." I cite "phased implementation" as prima facie evidence. Also, "high-performance rail" as a surrogate for "high-speed rail."
There is a "Ball of Confusion," as Bob Morris puts it, because this is an improvised, kludged together project that has no business being in existence. After all, we are not talking about a kids' playground, we are talking about a $100 billion dollar waste that will make a handful of people very rich, and leave all the rest of us paying the bills forever.
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CALIFORNIA HIGH SPEED RAIL PLANS CONTINUE TO BE BALL OF CONFUSION
by Bob Morris
Tue, May 10th 2011
The vision of high speed rail (HSR) is to have trains traveling between Los Angeles and San Francisco in 2 hours and 40 minutes, and from San Jose to San Francisco in 30 minutes. Voters authorized this in 2008 when Prop 1A passed. However, it only authorized $9.5 billion in bonds to finance HSR, and that's not nearly enough. The final cost might be $40 billion or more. [Yes, double that.] California hopes to get several billion more from the federal government, which will help, but won't end the funding shortfall. [That hope appears ever less likely by the day.]
Costs can't be accurately gauged because routes have not been decided on yet. The most contentious route decisions are where to place the new HSR tracks north of Los Angeles and how to put a train going 125 mph through the crowded, densely populated San Jose corridor.
In Los Angeles, the original plan was to put HSR through Soledad Canyon on the CA-14 corridor to Palmdale, which could then become a major regional transportation hub due to its existing airport and proposed DesertXpress HSR line to Las Vegas. However, the Burbank to Palmdale link is facing much higher costs than originally estimated due to the need for more tunneling. [The engineers didn't know that 8 years ago, with the program-level EIS/EIR?]
Thus, an alternate route going along I-5 and the Grapevine is being reconsidered, even though it previously had been rejected due to earthquake fears and costs. But now it appears that the Soledad Canyon route would be even more costly. Naturally, Palmdale and the Tejon Ranch Co. are alarmed by this possible change in route as they would lose out on substantial expected revenues.
HSR requires special rail lines and does not run on normal tracks. Furthermore, it needs to go over or under major intersections because 1) it can't slow down at crossings because it must average 143 mph along the way and 2) it can't risk a catastrophic accident should someone in a car stupidly try to cross when a HSR train is coming. So, the only alternative in such areas is to build it above the ground on platforms or underground in tunnels. This of course hugely increases costs.
The primary battleground for HSR is the San Francisco Peninsula. To meet the mandate of Prop 1A, HSR needs to travel at 125 mph while passing through it. This would need to be done with new rail lines, but how? To maintain the speed, the HSR would have to be a mix of above-ground and underground. But this is staggeringly expensive, not to mention disruptive to those nearby. Some homes and businesses next to the existing route would have to be demolished to make room for aboveground platforms, as well as approaches and exits for tunnels.
Some in the California Senate have proposed a "blended" plan which would scale back construction in the Peninsula from four tracks to two, and put much of it on the ground. But this, while much less expensive, is also highly problematic because major crossings would be closed every 5 to 6 minutes during rush hour, causing monumental and continual traffic jams. [That's the motive for doing this, since it will compel the communities to change their minds about grade separations and four tracks.]
As you might expect, NIMBYs are active in the Peninsula trying to block HSR, or at least put it underground. [Blaming NIMBYs for objecting to a bad project is a save bet since it limits the justification for criticism to something easily dismissed.]
But the problem is, the money just isn't there for HSR and it's unclear if it ever will be. The estimate is already at $43 billion [Now over $66 billion and still climbing.] and the inevitable cost overruns will no doubt make the completed project far more expensive. [Isn't that a good enough reason to reconsider this project? Questionable and doubtful funding sources concurrent with open-ended cost over-runs?]
Has any massive construction project ever come in under the original budget?
[Yes, but not in railroading. See: Bent Flyvbjerg]
