You may not recall a recent Federal Government Accounting Office (GAO) edict about the hastiness with which the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) administered the granting of the $8 billion in stimulus dollars for high-speed rail. I only have a vague recollection. I do remember that there was no preparation, strategic studies, policy debates or considerations of the larger transportation context into which this program was intended to be inserted.
So, let's take a closer look at this, since it is the federal government this time, not just California's high-speed rail authority, that is improvising a massive funding program for a fantasy vision of high-speed rail.
The GAO has not drawn the inferences we have here. That is to say, we believe that the funding decisions were guided by the White House for political reasons, providing funding to appropriate States and Congressional Districts that needed earmark funds from Washington to assist the re-election of relevant candidates. That indeed was the process to support the re-election of Democratic California Congressman Jim Costa, whose district is dominant in the Central Valley rail route required by the FRA, which specified that route to accompany additional funding.
It should be noted that the HSR Stimulus awards for California were announced in January, at the beginning of the 2010 November election cycle.
We also believe that the entire $8 billion stimulus package was inserted in the legislation at the last minute with the powerful persuasion of President Obama's Chief of Staff at that time, Rahm Emanuel. The primary target of those dollars was centered in the Chicago hub, intended for "high-speed rail" corridors which reach out like a spiderweb in various directions. Emanuel is now Mayor of Chicago. Before joining the President in Washington, he had been a Congressman from Illinois; just as Obama had been an Illinois Senator, Ray LaHood was an Illinois Congressman; Joe Szabo, the FRA head, is also from Illinois.
The language of the GAO report is very forgiving and mild in its criticism. At the time the award program was assigned to the FRA, that agency had no grant making capacity or staff. One was hastily assembled. I would imagine the political pressures on them were enormous. $8 billion is a lot of money to give away. [Disclosure: I was a program officer in the US Department of Education Research Group, the National Institute of Education, for fifteen years. It was a fund granting agency. I learned how the bureaucratic machinery operates.]
Let me say here that this is no big deal. It's not intended to be an "expose." However, we need to recognize the national high-speed rail program for what it actually is, not what the government wants us to believe. We have consistently pointed out our opinion that this is a government program intended for the distribution of federal dollars; the transportation aspects being subordinate to that cause.
It is also, of course, a show-piece. An attempt to reify the President's "Vision for Winning the Future."
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GAO-11-283, Intercity Passenger Rail: Recording Clearer Reasons for Awards Decisions Would Improve Otherwise Good Grantmaking Practices, March 10,…
Posted by on April 10, 2011
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) appropriated $8 billion for high and conventional speed passenger rail. The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), within the Department of Transportation (the department), was responsible for soliciting applications, evaluating them to determine program eligibility and technical merits, and selecting awards, which were announced in January 2010. This report examines the …
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GAO-11-283, Intercity Passenger Rail: Recording Clearer Reasons for Awards Decisions Would Improve Otherwise Good Grantmaking Practices, March 10,…
Summary
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) appropriated $8 billion for high and conventional speed passenger rail. The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), within the Department of Transportation (the department), was responsible for soliciting applications, evaluating them to determine program eligibility and technical merits, and selecting awards, which were announced in January 2010.
This report examines the extent to which FRA (1) applied its established criteria to select projects, (2) followed recommended practices for awarding discretionary grants, and (3) communicated outcomes to the public, compared with selected other Recovery Act competitive grant programs.
To address these topics GAO reviewed federal legislation, FRA documents, and guidance for other competitive grant programs using Recovery Act funds. GAO also analyzed data resulting from the evaluation and selection process and interviewed a cross-section of FRA officials and applicants.
FRA applied its established criteria during the eligibility and technical reviews, but GAO could not verify whether it applied its final selection criteria because the documented rationales for selecting projects were typically vague.
Specifically, FRA used worksheets and guidebooks that included the criteria outlined in the funding announcement to aid in assessing the eligibility and technical merit of applications. FRA also recorded general reasons for selecting applications and publicly posted broad descriptions of the selected projects. However, the documented reasons for these selection decisions were typically vague or restated the criteria listed in the funding announcement.
In addition, there were only general reasons given for the applications not selected or for adjusting applicants' requested funding amounts. FRA subsequently provided GAO with more detailed reasons for several of its selection decisions, but this information was not included in the department's record of its decisions.
Documentation on the rationales for selection decisions is a key part of ensuring accountability and is recommended by the department as well as other federal agencies. Without a detailed record of selection decisions, FRA leaves itself vulnerable to criticism over the integrity of those decisions--an important consideration, given that passenger rail investments have a very public profile.
FRA also substantially followed recommended practices when awarding grants, including communicating key information to applicants prior to the competition, planning for the competition, using a merit review panel with certain characteristics, assessing whether applicants were likely to be able to account for grant funds, notifying applicants of awards decisions, and documenting the rationale for awards decisions (albeit generally).
For example, FRA issued a funding announcement that communicated key pieces of information, such as eligibility, technical review, and selection criteria. FRA officials also conducted extensive outreach to potential applicants, including participating in biweekly conference calls, providing several public presentations on the program, and conducting one-on-one site visits with potential applicants.
According to FRA, officials used lessons from a number of other grant programs when developing its approach to reviewing and selecting projects. FRA publicly communicated outcome information similar to other Recovery Act competitive grant programs we examined, including projects selected, how much money they were to receive, and a general description of projects and their intended benefits.
Only one of the programs GAO examined communicated more outcome information on technical scores and comments; however, this program used a much different approach to select awards than FRA used to select intercity passenger rail awards. According to officials, FRA did not disclose outcome information from the technical reviews because officials were concerned that releasing reviewers' names and associated scores could discourage them from participating in future grant application reviews.
GAO recommends that FRA create additional records to document the substantive reasons behind award decisions to better ensure accountability for its use of federal funds. In commenting on a draft of this report, the department agreed to consider our recommendation. The department also provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
Recommendations for Executive Action
Recommendation: To help ensure accountability over federal funds, the Secretary of Transportation should direct the Administrator of the Federal Railroad Administration to create additional records that document the rationales for award decisions in future high speed intercity passenger rail (HSIPR) funding rounds, including substantive reasons (1) why individual projects are selected or not selected and (2) for changes made to requested funding amounts.
Agency Affected: Department of Transportation
Status: In process
Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
