Because this more than a year old article, below, was cited in another new article, I'm bringing it back here because Robert Goodspeed did a splendid research job and laid out the facts that make a compelling argument against high-speed rail.
What's valuable about this article is its predictive power. After all, this is over a year later and we can see what happened to ARRA funding awards (not yet resolved, actually), and how well the process is going in California.
I'm a fan of irony. Here's some. In 2009, Karen Rae,the FRA Administrator, was laying out some ground rules for dispersing federal funds. She said, "We're not going to build rails to nowhere." Did you get that? Amazingly, what the CHSRA is promising to build in the Central Valley is the first section of the first two segments of the intended 400 miles of high-speed rail. That's what they want us to believe.
What we're actually getting is a train from nowhere to nowhere. Realistically, what are the chances for more funding to go beyond their current plans to lay around 100 miles of track for Amtrak use? You would think from their posturing that they are the Pharaoh Cheops ordering the first row of 2.3 million limestone blocks for the Great Pyramid. They wish!
Robert Goodspeed (a wonderful name appropriate for this topic) makes the point that it is not only the lack of funding that will impose terminal restrictions on this project, but also the lack of technical knowledge (which we must import) and "our troubled infrastructure planning and delivery systems."
Let's look at that a moment. In these blogs we have been making the point that this California project is a solution looking for problems. There has been no prior strategic planning for California's entire transportation situation and future needs. In that sense, HSR came out of nowhere, like a personal whim of a handful of back-room politicians. "Wouldn't it be great to build a high-speed rail up and down California? We'll come up with the reasons later." That's not good enough. There is no transportation context, not overarching policies, that address the movement of people and goods in our state.
Any transportation plan that does not incorporate the "big picture," including highway transit of automobiles, trucks and buses, and commercial aviation, both people and freight, as well as rail, is grossly incomplete. Instead, the rail authority pits its modality, HSR, against these other transportation modes, seeking to replace them. What about major upgrades to existing rail? Not important.
What are the strategic plans for urban and regional public mass commuter transit in our major population regions? What are our priorities in the moving of people and goods insofar as they do or don't impinge on economic growth plans? What are our freight priorities and should they be subservient to passenger movement?
This is not only shortsighted, but suggests the realities behind this HSR project as purely politically motivated pork; seeking, getting and spending other peoples' money regardless of the outcome.
This is not only shortsighted, but suggests the realities behind this HSR project as purely politically motivated pork; seeking, getting and spending other peoples' money regardless of the outcome.
The state operates a number of fragmented, discreet systems of transit that lack basic coordination to the point of conflict. So, I ask again, what is the transit/transportation context into which this high-speed rail is intended to be a key component? Where are those plans? And, most important, where are the solidly based priorities? Should inter-city rail dominate urban and regional mass transit? (Our answer to that question is an emphatic no.)
At the end of his article, Goodspeed drives home the point about all the existing shortcomings that will guarantee a failure of this proposed project in California, and the HSR vision for the United States. In comparing the HSR development process in France to ours, he says:
"In the U.S. on the other hand, government agencies act both as project designers and boosters, relegating other stakeholders to reactionary roles as outsiders who rely on lawsuits to pursue their interests. In addition, our government agencies are also lacking in competent planners and administrators who specialize in rail. In the end, dysfunctional planning processes and weak planning capacity may result in avoidable cost overruns. Overcoming these obstacles may prove even more challenging than finding the historically elusive political will."
If Goodspeed is talking about anybody, it's us. Remember, this was written over a year ago. Realities have come to prove him correct.
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http://www.planetizen.com/node/41658
The Future of American High Speed Rail: Regional and Slow
Robert Goodspeed
Fri, 11/13/2009 - 09:04
During his dramatic presentation last April, President Barack Obama laid out a bold vision for high speed rail in America. Wielding a stylish red, white, and blue map (below) he presented the proposed corridors for new high speed trains. (Similar, if not identical, to plans long sitting on the shelf at the Federal Railway Administration.) He asked Americans to "Imagine whisking through towns at speeds over 100 miles an hour, walking only a few steps to public transportation, and ending up just blocks from your destination." In reality limited funds, our dysfunctional planning processes, and the historical lack of investment in rail will mean the U.S. will most likely end up with a diverse collection of regional rail systems that may not go that fast.
Americans that have visited Europe or Asia have likely experienced modern high speed rail systems. France's TGV system, the product of decades of upgrades and improvements to the existing passenger rail system, now extends from the Chunnel to Marseille by way of Paris.
Spain's rapidly growing AVE train network is credited by the Guardian with transforming traditionally provincial Spanish society with trains topping out at over 180 mph. China is famously pursuing an aggressive plan to expand their high speed rail network. Siemens considers the new service inaugurated between Moscow and St. Petersburg in Russia a testing ground for technology they hope to sell in America, which the Siemens spokesman quipped is "like a developing country in terms of rail" during an on-board interview with the New York Times.
Will our system look anything like these? The answer, as transportation wonks already know, is no. Even the $8 billion appropriated by the stimulus is a small portion of the funds required to implement even a portion of Obama's plan. This became painfully obvious at a briefing sponsored by the Rappaport Institute I attended recently, where Federal Railway Administration Administrator Karen Rae described how they viewed the $8 billion a modest sum to invest strategically in the rail network, sometimes for trains running well below Obama's 100 mph goal.
In fact, the High Speed Rail Strategic Plan released in April includes not only new high speed service with top speeds over 150 mph, but also investment in "emerging and regional" services with top speeds of 90-110 mph, and upgrade reliability and services on "conventional" intercity rail services with speeds up to 79-90 mph. In response to the ARRA call for proposals, the Federal Railway Administration announced in October they received an "overwhelming" 45 applications, saying they would delay announcement of winners beyond the announced goal of November to sometime "this winter."
What high speed rail should Americans expect? With significant bond funds approved by voters and serious planning underway, the California high speed rail plans seem a likely recipient of some of the funds. The Chicago region, with engaged stakeholders and a rich tradition of rail is another likely candidate.
Despite hopefully boosters, the other corridors, such as Pacific Northwest, Florida, New England, and Texas, seem less likely for high speed rail in the near future. Despite political leaders who don't want to be left out in cities in Arizona or Utah, Rae mentioned another important variable to a reporter in October: "We're not going to build rails to nowhere." In addition to having a local plan, high speed rail will work best when it can integrate with cities with well developed public transit networks at either end. Transportation planners know the "last mile" connections can play a critical role in determining whether riders will choose rail over other options -- such as driving or flying.
Ironically, the California system is demonstrating the biggest problems for high speed rail in the U.S. may not be our lack of technical knowledge but our troubled infrastructure planning and delivery system. Disputes about alignments in California have already spawned lawsuits. Maybe beyond ogling their trains, we should study how our foreign counterparts resolve conflicts about system design. In one case study I read about planning a TGV line in France, the government convened a "debate" bringing together the stakeholders before choosing an alignment or other technical details.
In the U.S. on the other hand, government agencies act both as project designers and boosters, relegating other stakeholders to reactionary roles as outsiders who rely on lawsuits to pursue their interests. In addition, our government agencies are also lacking in competent planners and administrators who specialize in rail. In the end, dysfunctional planning processes and weak planning capacity may result in avoidable cost overruns. Overcoming these obstacles may prove even more challenging than finding the historically elusive political will.
Robert Goodspeed is a PhD student at the MIT Department of Urban Studies and Planning.
The views expressed are solely those of the author, and do not represent the views of any group or organization that he or she is affiliated with unless clearly stated, nor the views of Planetizen.
